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Abstract 
This report provides a wide picture on a new database on the weekly government statements 
in France. They provide detailed information on the effective agenda of French governments 
over time. A detailed topic coding, moreover, allows for an analysis of the evolution of 
relative attention to different topics.  
This report presents a series of research questions and projects that have motivated the 
creation of this database in the first place. It moreover provides a series of descriptive 
analyses and tentative answers to some of the research questions raised in the introductory 
section.  
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Introduction 
How does government attention to policy issues evolve over time? What determines 
changes in government attention? Are there some policies that durably attract more attention 
than others? Are there policies, on the contrary, that only attract attention periodically? How 
do parties and elections play into government attention? Are there left-wing and right-wing 
issues? Has popularity an impact on government priorities? How about media attention? Can 
the media determine government attention? Or does media attention disrupt policymaking or 
affect it in some significant way? 
These and other questions, we contend, can be investigated – if not answered – by our 
new dataset on weakly government declarations in France. This dataset contains topic codings 
for every single item mentioned on the weakly press conference following the meeting of the 
ministerial council at the Elysée Palace for a period starting in 1974. This dataset contains 
more than 6000 entries accounting for governmental priorities for this period. Each entry is, 
moreover, assigned a “topic code”. The codebook is inspired from the original US policy 
agendas project, realized by Frank Baumgartner, Bryan Jones and John Wilkerson1. The 
French codebook is the result of an initial translation of the original US codebook, but has 
also incorporated subsequent changes that have been negotiated across all existing national 
agenda projects2. It contains about 250 different items, organized into 27 “major topics”, 
ranging from Economic Policy or Health to Immigration, Transport or Foreign Policy. 
 
This report presents the data contained in this new dataset, providing descriptive 
statistics, as well as a discussion of the kind of theoretical problems that this kind of data may 
help elucidating (Section 1). Section 2 will study the evolution of policy priorities over time. 
Finally, we will devote some time to study effects of partisan government on policy attention 
(Section 3).  
 
                                                 
1
 Cf. http://www.policyagendas.org. 
2
 More elements on this aspect on http://www.comparativeagendas.org. 
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Section 1: Questions and data 
This section will briefly discuss potential questions to which our project may deliver potential 
replies (1.). It will then go over to present the general structure of our data and the analyses 
developed in the rest of this report (2.). 
 
1. Understanding the dynamics of policy attention 
How does policy evolve over time? With the their work on the politics of attention 
Baumgartner and Jones (Baumgartner & Jones, 2005) have probably made one of the most 
important recent contributions to the study of public policy. Their book deals with classical 
debates in the area of public policy concerning the determinants of the directions public 
policy decisions may take. Those debates can be divided into at least three major categories. 
A first group of authors assumes that politics hardly affects policymaking and, if it does, only 
very incremenially. A second group of authors tends to disagree, but sees change as 
essentially the product of sector level developments. Finally, another substantial strand of 
literature argues that parties do matter, albeit not always the way we would expect.  
 
1.1 The weak-politics thesis 
A first group of authors remains fundamentally skeptical towards the very capacity of policy 
making and the effects of politics. Indeed, probably a majority of public-policy specialists do 
not consider partisan politics to play any significant role in everyday policymaking. Yet, there 
is a great variety of arguments that can be found under this heading.  
A classical approach has tended to argue that politics is unlikely to have any strong impact on 
policymaking, provided that policies are determined by a variety of factors that water down 
the influence of politics. For example, Cutright (1965), Haniff (1976) or Wilenski (1975) 
point out that welfare-state expenses depend on economic growth and demographic variations 
rather than on partisan preferences. And there is a lot of evidence to show that even today, the 
ageing of European populations is the single most important factor driving reforms and 
welfare state retrenchment. The detailed historical work of R. Rose and P. L. Davies (1994) 
on Britain policies also concludes that parties do not matter in policy making. Evidence on 
budgetary policy in France tends to confirm these conclusions (Baumgartner, Foucault, & 
François, 2009).  
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While not in contradiction, there are at least two sub-groups in this view of the policy process. 
A first tradition is mainly interested in explaining the policy process as a whole, while a 
second focuses on sector-level analyses of individual policies. 
 
1.1.1. Macro-views of the policy process 
US public policy, moreover, has been dominated by “incrementalist” views of policymaking 
(Lindblom, 1959). These ultimately assume that most policies can hardly be considered to 
have been discussed by political representatives. Rather, on a day-to-day basis, policymaking 
is managed by policy experts and entrepreneurs. These are potentially part of policy 
subsystems of some kind (Heclo, 1977). The main characteristic of policymaking is the 
technique of “muddling through”, rather than that of a grand political design, where elected 
representatives implement the mandate they have received from voters.  
But more fundamentally, these approaches in fact focus on macro-processes of policymaking 
as they ambition nothing less than explaining THE policymaking process. In a review of 
advances in public policy theory over the past thirty years, Peter John (2003) argued that only 
three major works had been added since seventies and had opened up new perspectives. The 
first are the policy streams of John Kingdon’s (1984) work. Policymaking can be understood 
as several distinct processes – streams – that sometimes interact, but that are moved by 
fundamentally different factors. The first element concerns the recognition  and definition of 
problems. The second concerns the definition of policy solutions, determined by policy 
communities where “ideas float around” like “molecules…in the primeval soup” (Kingdon 
1984: 116/117). Finally, the political stream concerns political representatives. It is the 
interaction between those three that may open up policy windows and, thus, lead to change. 
This process, while probably rather realistic, leaves a lot of space to accidents and has proved 
difficult in terms of hypothesis-testing.  
A different development is the work of Baumgartner and Jones. In Agendas and Instability in 
American Politics, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) proposed their “external pressure model”. 
Baumgartner & Jones (2005: 84:5) state that policy change can be explained through external 
issue-intrusion rather than electoral change. But the major contribution in their work concerns 
the distribution of attention. Attention and, thus, agenda-space are rare goods in 
policymaking. Decision-makers are constrained by time and their cognitive limits. Hence the 
real question is not so much where change comes from, as there are constantly a myriad of 
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actors pressuring the government for change. The real question is how demands for change 
are filtered, computed and, eventually, responded to.  
Baumgartner and Jones (2005) show that there is a great deal of inertia in political attention – 
due to “institutional friction”. As a consequence, policy demands will have to build up a lot of 
momentum before being “heard”. However, if this high threshold is reached and policymakers 
finally respond to demands, they will compensate for earlier inaction through over-attention 
to the issue. The result is a distribution of changes in attention that is very far from the Central 
Limit Theorem. Rather, the distribution of attention is strongly leptokurtic, meaning that there 
is a very high number of issues where no change takes place while there are few or no 
moderate changes. However, a non-neglectable number of issues will undergo very strong 
change.  
The authors further complexify their analytical framework by showing that friction depends 
on a variety of issues, such as the position in the decision-making chain or institutional 
procedures. For instance, Congress hearings tend to be rather “open”, i.e. they will follow 
closely swings in attention in the general public or the media. As such, there distribution will 
be rather normal. At the opposite end of the decision-making chain, adopted bills will hardly 
represent public opinion. A bill will have to have made a long way from public opinion, to 
Congress hearings, to the executive, legislative committees and the plenary, plus further 
potentially disruptive media attention in the later stages of the bill (Jones, Larsen-Price, & 
Wilkerson, 2009). 
Case studies on policy agendas elsewhere than the US have confirmed the existence of some 
kind of “power law” of policy-making processes that holds across very diverse agendas and 
institutional and political settings. Yet, this may also stem from large definition of the agenda 
and policymaking in this work. It is true that the two other group of authors do not develop 
such general theories of policymaking. 
 
1.1.2. Long-term perspectives 
Finally, long-term analyses of the policy process represent another way of conceptualizing 
macro-views of policymaking. Alan Mayhew (1991), for instance, in an influential analysis of 
US policymaking since World War 2, concluded that policymaking transcends partisan 
politics. Contrary to accepted wisdom, Mayhew sets out to show that divided government 
does not have the expected negative consequences for the policymaking capacities of either 
the presidency or Congress. Furthermore, while this is not strongly conceptualized, Mayhew 
shows that policy change is determined by “surges”, i.e. some kind of policymaking fashions. 
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Mayhew in particular identifies “progressive” policy periods and more conservative ones. 
These periods, however, do not coincide with periods of Democratic or Conservative 
governments. Republican president Richard Nixon’s government adopted probably one of the 
most progressive pieces of legislation with regard to social housing, while Democratic 
president James Carter initiated a new cycle of more conservative policies that later 
culminated under Ronald Reagan.  
Those surges are of course difficult to identify unambiguously. Yet, there are many arguments 
about the long-term transformation of policy-making, such as arguments on the “rise of the 
regulatory state” (Majone, 1997, 1990) or the rise of the “managerial state” (Clarke & 
Newman, 1997), welfare state retrenchment (Korpi, 2003) or restructuring (Scharpf & 
Schmidt, 2000) or the emergence of a new paradigm in public administration (Dunleavy & 
Hood, 1994; Hood, 1995). This list is of course not exhaustive, but simply illustrates the 
importance of attempts to identify and name long-term changes that affect contemporary 
states in advanced industrial democracies and elsewhere.  
 
1.1.3. The policy-shapes-politics thesis and sector-level politics 
Beyond those marco-views, a second strand of literature has focused on sector-level politics 
to understand the policy process. This has at least partly built on central “incrementalist 
paradigm” of US policy studies, but has been dominated by European scholars. 
Maybe one of the most influential contributions in this area has been a series of articles by 
Theodor Lowi in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Lowi, 1964, 1972). The author developed a 
counter-intuitive approach. Turning classical theories upside down, the author argued that 
policies create specific types of policy conflict according to whether they are redistributive, 
distributive or regulatory in nature. While his classification has since been abandoned – it was 
too deterministic -, the general thrust of the slogan “policy shapes politics” survived. Yet 
rather than concentrating on some kind of intrinsic nature of policies, which proved illusory, 
this slogan can now be read in a more institutionalist manner. Put differently, actors that want 
to influence a given policy are constrained by existing definitions, framing, institutions, 
cleavages etc. of those same policies. Any strategy of change will have to take those existing 
structures into account.  
This has created or fuelled sector-level analyses of policymaking and interest in a wide array 
of different types of actors. The policy-subsystem literature and the wider literature on policy 
communities and networks (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Le Galès & Thatcher, 1995) has 
concentrated on understanding those institutions and the political battles that take place at the 
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sector level. Case studies and theoretical work in this field look at sector-level political 
institutions and structures, actors and rules. Rather than political parties, this work will focus 
on interest or citizen groups, experts, bureaucrats and related actors. 
Sector level studies thus do not reject the influence of politics in policymaking. Simply, entire 
libraries of case-studies tend to show that politics is made up of bureaucrats, interested 
citizens, experts and other types of stake-holders. Political parties and electoral 
representatives may, on occasion, play a role, but rarely in the way that classical mandate 
theories of politics expect them to.  
From a theoretical point of view, this type of literature has led to a renewal of the 
conceptualization of the state as an intrinsically hybrid entity that is both an actor and an 
arena, where many different types of actors meet and influence each other. This is probably 
best epitomized by the term “governance” (Rhodes, 1997; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). 
 
1.2 The partisan-influence hypothesis 
Quite contrary to the public-policy perspectives reviewed above, there still is a large literature 
that argues that election matter, that elected representatives fulfill their mandates and that 
alternation in power leads to policy change. The partisan-influence thesis was initially a way 
to demonstrate the intrinsically political character of public spending, as opposed to 
efficiency- or economy-based explanations (Castles, 1982; Castles & McKinlay, 1979; Blais, 
Blake, & Dion, 1993; Cameron, 1978). Much work in this tradition has mainly been based on 
general assumptions on what typical leftwing and rightwing spending patterns are supposed to 
look like. Based on the assumption of “issue ownership”, the Left, for instance, was expected 
to spend more on welfare, while the Right was supposed to increase spending in defence 
(Bawn, 1999; Boix, 2000).  
In one of its most forceful and more interesting versions, this argument is based on the effect 
of party platforms on spending. Budge and Hofferbert present the partisan hypothesis as a 
“mandate theory of party democracy” (Budge & Hofferbert, 1990; Hofferbert & Budge, 
1992). This groundbreaking work has had a lasting influence as it presents several original 
specifications concerning the importance of salience and issue ownership (Budge & 
Hofferbert, 1990: 114). Unlike earlier and much subsequent work, moreover, Budge and 
Hofferbert show that party platforms are a significant predictor of spending priorities, 
irrespective of diverging political structures, even in countries with supposedly weak parties 
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like the US3. They confirm mandate theory and, thus, one of the fundamental justifications of 
liberal democracies.  
The actual importance of the partisan hypothesis has been qualified, however. Schmidt has 
shown that certain contexts and institutions may somewhat weaken partisan influence on 
policymaking (Schmidt, 1996, 2002). Moreover, several recent contributions have questioned 
the continuing importance of partisan influence. Boix, for instance, shows that while the 
partisan hypothesis has been verified for much of the postwar period, specific spending 
patterns have faded between the late eighties and early nineties (Boix, 2000). The 
explanations for fading differences or the “end of ideology” are various. While some authors 
have renewed industrial society convergence theory (Pryor, 1968; Parkin, 1973), others claim 
that other factors may decrease the likeliness of partisan influence. In particular, some 
scholars explain that globalisation (Garrett & Lange, 1989; Keohane & Milner, 1996), the 
increasing levels of complex interdependence (Nye, 1976; Keohane & Nye, 1989) and 
international capital mobility (Simmons, 2001; Goodman & Pauly, 1993; Frieden & 
Rogowski, 1996; Garrett, 1996) decrease sharply the probability of partisan influence. More 
generally, arguments about the cartelization of parties (Katz & Mair, 1995; Blyth & Katz, 
2005) or the decline of the social basis of party politics (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2005) come to 
similar conclusions concerning decreasing party influence. 
In sum, while some say that parties do not have any significant influence on most issues, 
others argue that they do. A third line of arguments puts forth that parties may have had an 
influence in the past, but that this influence is fading.  
 
1.3 Towards an institutional perspective of policymaking: political attention cycles 
Last but not least, our dataset, by investigating the dynamics of government’s issue attention, 
provides tools for tracking issue attention dynamics and to understand whether the 
government’s issue attention follows discernible cycles (Downs 1972). Data and variables on 
policy content in a long period (1974-2006) provide quantitative indicators for testing the 
dynamics of government’s attention. This may, in fact allow for a new kind of understanding 
of the interaction between policymaking and politics. 
One potential research venue and objective could be the mapping of public policies according 
to their relative political sensitiveness. We can assume that some policies are to narrow in 
                                                 
3
 But see the discussion by King and Laver and the authors’ reply (King & Laver, 1993) 
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focus, costs or benefits to interest a large fraction of the electorate, of public opinion or the 
media. In other areas, in turn, even minor initiatives may be become very quickly very salient 
and may pushed by partisan actors to improve their situation or to deteriorate the position of 
their opponents. This mapping exercise may be an end in itself as it may allow to understand 
the space of political competition in a given political context.  
Once this classification is done, however, a lot of questions remain. Studies on the impact of 
alternation on government outputs in France have so far been inconclusive. A study on French 
budget has shown essentially that there are hardly is a “Mitterrand” effect in terms of 
spending, nor have the systematic subsequent government alternations between 1981 and 
2002 led to any discernible pattern in spending (Baumgartner, Foucault, & François, 2006). A 
futher analysis, comparing presidential speeches, government statements and adopted laws, 
has come to similar results concerning government priorities (Baumgartner, Brouard, & 
Grossman, 2009). 
Yet, future research should pay attention to the interaction between the political and the 
institutional context in order to identify issue competition and ownership (Green-Pedersen, 
2007). One potential direction here could be political attention cycles. The simple idea behind 
this term is similar to that underlying the concepts of political budget or business cycles 
(Brender & Drazen, 2005; Rogoff, 1990). According to this literature, governments are likely 
to bring economic cycles closer to the electoral cycle through macroeconomic stabilization 
and spending. The underlying idea is that voters will judge an incumbent government more 
favorably if the wider economic context is perceived as inherently good or improving. 
Evidence on the existence of such cycles is mixed. There are many reasons for this: in the 
context of free capital movement and economic globalization, governments are no longer free 
to arbitrarily raise spending. This is particularly true for EU member states like France, where 
the “stability and growth pact” in principle strongly limits budgetary autonomy. Moreover, in 
the context of greater economic interdependence, the effectiveness of such measures may be 
more than neutralized by foreign markets, leading simply to a deterioration of the balance of 
payments.  
Political attention cycles may thus appear as the perfect answer to those problems from the 
point of view of governments. Rather than increasing spending and trying to change the 
economic context, governments may simply signal their attachment to a given fraction of 
society through shifting attention to issues dear to a particular group in the context of 
increasing electoral competition. Work on economic voting and the opinion policy link have 
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shown that this kind of linkage may vary as a function of the institutional and political 
context, though (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005; van der Brug, van der Eijk, & Franklin, 2007).   
 
 
2. New data to understand old problems 
The data compiled from the communiqués may help solve some of the puzzles that the 
preceding section refers to. French weekly government statements from 1974 to 2006 were 
selected to study week-to-week government issue attention. They are issued by the French 
council of ministers (Conseil des ministres), which is a mandatory governmental meeting held 
on weekly basis (except during governmental holidays), i.e. from 48 to 50 times a year. It 
includes the President, the Prime Minister, all ministers, and some ministres délégués or state 
secretaries to discuss current issues and bill proposals. Statement are published immediately 
after the meeting and contain from 3 to 17 items. Those items include bill proposals, 
communications, decrees and ordinances (another type of decree). The summary for each item 
may vary from a couple of lines to a couple of pages. There are very few interruptions and the 
format is overall stable, weekly government statements thus represent a formidable indicator 
of government attention. 
How can you measure government attention to policy issues and their eventual change in the 
long and in the short run? This study provides easily identifiable sources for comparative and 
case study research in the general field of public policy and more specifically on political 
parties, political institutions, and studies of the issue-attention cycles.  
The data is publicly available, in principle. Data availability is largely unproblematic for the 
past fifteen years or so. For the period before, we benefited from support by government 
services and obtained electronic data for the period from 1974 to 1995. Hence our database 
currently covers governments from the first government of Pierre Messmer in 1974 to the 
government of Dominique de Villepin in 2006. For these years we have, moreover, the date 
for each item and a serial number created by governmental services. A developer cleaned up 
this data and compiled it into a spread sheet. Data quality is rather stable over time, as is the 
general structure of presentation of the data. Only the earliest period (1974-1978) presents 
some irregularities and is, generally speaking, of lower quality, as individual items and/or 
initiators of individual items are less clearly identifiable. Data structure (page setting, item 
size, content presentation) varies slightly over time, although it does not affect statistical 
analysis as our coding unit was the statement's item. 
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Graph 1 shows the general structure of the data. All items thus add up to a total of 8768 items.  
Graph 1.1 – Statement types 
 
 
As graphs 2 and 3 show, the structure and amount government activity significantly varies 
with cabinets. Especially in the early periods under study “communications” strongly 
outweigh bills. Communications are statements of all kinds, ranging from action plans on 
crime and summaries of the last G7 meeting to government statements on the flooding of a 
certain region of France. Bills, instead, vary little in time. They are not very visible under the 
first two governments considered, probably due to the general quality of the data for the two 
Messmer governments.  
 
Graphs 1.2 and 1.3 : Government activity by type of item 
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Decrees and ordinances are of varying importance, too. Ordinances have been increasing 
significantly since the year 2000 in particularly, for reasons that are not very well known so 
far (Grossman, 2008). 
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One of the major problems with the study of French institutional and political life has to do 
with the varying length of government tenure. This is not 
simply linked to government instability, such as under the 
4th Republic or in Italy’s “1st” Republic. It has to do with 
the diverging length of presidential and legislative 
mandates. Until 1981, dissolution of the Assembly was 
exception, but it has become more common since. As a 
consequence, Assembly tenures have had their lengths 
varying from two to five, while governments have know 
tenures from 9 months to five years. Even presidential 
tenure has varied, as the mandate has been reduced from 
seven to five, to bring it line with the parliamentary 
mandate4.  
Hence, studying legislative productivity in this 
perspective becomes more difficult as the periods 
compared are not necessarily very similar. For instance, 
the Chirac government in 1986 knew that it would not 
last beyond the 1988 presidential election. Chirac had 
already been a candidate to the 1981 presidential election 
and it was not secret that he was aiming at replacing 
Mitterrand in the upcoming election. Hence, if he won, he 
would pick a new Prime minister. If he lost, however, 
there was little doubt, either, that Mitterrand would call 
for new legislative elections as he had one after his 
election in 1981. Hence electoral horizons vary strongly, 
as does the tenure of legislatures: 5,5,3,5,2,5,4,5,5. 
Government tenure This should in principle be over after 
the 2000 reform that brought presidential and parliamentary mandates in line, as voters are 
expected to vote similarly in elections that take place within six weeks. Yet, there is enough 
evidence of split votes elsewhere, to trust the French to discover it sooner or later.  
                                                 
4
 Presidential pre-eminence and government tenure are part of longstanding debates in French politics that we 
analysed elsewhere (Grossman, 2009; Grossman & Sauger, 2009). 
Table 1.1 – Legislatures, 
governments and presidents in 
France 
Année-
gvt Lég. Gouvernement Président 
1974   Messmer 2 
1974,3   Messmer 3 
Pompidou 
  
1974,6   Chirac I 
1975   Chirac I 
1976 IV Chirac I 
1976,5   Barre 1 
1977   Barre 1 
1977,5   Barre 2 
1978   Barre 2 
1978,5   Barre 3 
1979 V Barre 3 
1980   Barre 3 
1981   Barre 3 
 Giscard 
1981,5   Mauroy 1-2 
1982   Mauroy 2 
1983   Mauroy 2 
1983,5 VI Mauroy 3 
1984   Mauroy 3 
1984,5   Fabius 
1985   Fabius 
1986   Fabius 
1986,5   Chirac 2 
1987 VII Chirac 2 
1988   Chirac 2 
Mitterrand 
1 
1988,5   Rocard 1-2 
1989   Rocard 2 
1990   Rocard 2 
1991 VIII Rocard 2 
1991,5   Cresson 
1992   Cresson 
1992,5   Bérégovoy 
1993   Bérégovoy 
1993,5   Balladur 
1994   Balladur 
1995 IX Balladur 
Mitterand 
2 
1995,5   Juppé I 
1996   Juppé II 
1997   Juppé II 
1997,5   Jospin 
1998   Jospin 
1999 X Jospin 
2000   Jospin 
2001   Jospin 
2002   Jospin 
Chirac 1 
2002,5   Raffarin I-II 
2003   Raffarin II 
2004 XI Raffarin II 
2004,5   Raffarin III 
2005   Raffarin III 
2005,5   Villepin 
2006   Villepin 
Chirac 2 
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It appears that the most “productive” governments taking into account all of the above 
categories (bills, statements, decrees and ordinances) have been Chirac 1 (right-wing) in 
1976, Barre 3 (right-wing) in 1979 and Mauroy 2 (left-wing) in 1982. The governments that 
most communicated were almost the same: Mauroy 2 in 1982 (330 communications) and 
Barre 3 in 1980 (326 communications) and 1979 (322 communications). The leader in the 
“bills” category is Raffarin III in 2004 (131 items), Chirac I  in 1975 (107 items), Raffarin II 
in 2003 (99 items). 
Moreover, beyond ideology, there also is some evolution over time, as graph 4 illustrates. 
Graph 1.4 - Items frequency (clustered by statement type) by years 
The 1970s and early 1980s thus showed intense governmental productivity, especially in 
terms of communication. This period was followed by a relative 15-year decline in statement 
production until the 2000s. Government productivity has started rising again and culminated 
in 2004/2005, which seems to have been an exceptionally productive year.  
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The dramatic decrease of statements since its peak in 1980 has only partially been 
compensated for by overall rise in the three other categories. It may say something about the 
relative efficiency of government statements through this weakly declaration. It is certain that 
TV statements by individual members of the executive have probably replaced this type of 
government statements, which has become a lot more “technical” overt time. 
 
In sum, this is a large dataset, covering a long historical period and many different 
configurations of the distribution of power. It should allow for a great variety of analyses. The 
remaining sections will look at some of those possibilities.  
  
 
 
 
Statmnt/year C P C+P
Mean 161 71.03 232.03
Std Dev 108.57 27.89 101.16
Median 114 74 206
Mode 114 74 168
Minimum 31 6 85
Maximum 424 141 450
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Section 2: The evolution of policy priorities 
As we have seen in the preceding section, large strands of public-policy analyses assume that 
changes in policy take place through incremental processes that are not visible in the short 
run. Arguments on the rise of the regulatory state, increasing interdependence or the crisis of 
the welfare state all make arguments about the way in which those changes should take place 
independent from party government. This section will realize a brief mapping exercise 
concerning the long-term evolution of several major policy areas.  
Figure 2.1 
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Figure 2.1 provides a general overview over our data by topic. If anything, this kind of graph 
shows that there a lot of variance over time and that it is not straightforward to pinpoint 
unambiguous long-term trends. Hence we will disaggregate this graph into several, in order to 
better understand this evolution. We will first look at the overall evolution of the agenda 
structure, before identifying changing or stable sectors. Finally, we will look at some cases in 
more detail.  
 
1. General tendencies 
Before looking into the evolution of attention, we will briefly look at the structure of 
attention. One way of doing this is by measuring the overall dispersion of attention among all 
topics. In the work of comparative agendas, this is conventionally measured through the 
entropy of attention and, more precisely, through Shannon’s H5. This is not the place to 
explain in detail how Shannon’s H is computed (Brouard, Wilkerson et al., 2010). Simply, in 
the indexed version of entropy that we use here, 1 means a perfectly dispersed attention and 0 
would signal the total concentration of attention on one issue only. Rather than trying to 
interpret the relative importance of each level, it is important to note here that the entropy 
increases over time, i.e. that attention becomes more and more dispersed. One hypothesis, put 
forth by Baumgartner and others, is that dispersion increases with volume. 
Figure 2.2 – Entropy and volume 
 
A cursory look at the different graphs in figure 2.2 shows that first that entropy has indeed 
been increasing over time. At the same time, however, as the graph in the middle shows, the 
                                                 
5
 Shannon’s H has proved more solid and less sensitive to variance in frequencies than other commonplace 
indicators, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) that economists use to measure market 
concentration. 
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relation between volume, i.e. the number of measures per year, and entropy is far from 
straightforward. The adjustment curve is in fact negatively sloped, which would mean that 
entropy decreases with volume. Yet, as we have explained above, the communiqués were 
used slightly different in the early period under study. And this period, as the right-hand graph 
shows, is characterized by the historically highest levels of activity. Put differently, this 
period is not particularly representative of the rest of the period. We therefore plot a second 
regression line excluding all observations prior to 1981. As a consequence, the relation 
between volume and entropy become positive. In fact, it becomes stronger and stronger, thus 
validating Baumgartner’s hypothesis concerning the positive effect of volume on entropy.  
This may in itself be a significant observation, as this tells us something about the overall 
tendency of governments to focus on certain policy areas, rather than others. The above 
graphs appear to show that specialization is becoming less and les possible and likely. 
Governments are constantly confronted with an ever-increasing number of external incentives 
and signals to a point where differentiation between left-wing and right-wing policies is 
hardly discernible anymore. This is a widely accepted conclusion, though the evidence 
presented here is less straightforward, as we will see in a later section. 
A separate question, which has been central to analyses of agenda-setting concerns the 
distribution of attention. As explained later in greater detail, Baumgartner and Jones focus on 
the importance of punctuations in political attention (Baumgartner & Jones, 2005).  
 
2. Stable and changing sectors 
Figure 2.3. presents general trend lines for policy sectors marked by insignificant and weak 
changes in government attention. It includes eleven policy sectors. We divide those into a 
group of slowly increasing and another of slowly decreasing attention. Table 2.1 presents the 
coefficients for the regression lines with the corresponding standard error. While some 
coefficients are statistically significant, e.g. immigration, the overall tendency is very weak 
for both sides. For immigration, there is a slight decrease in attention, essentially due to the 
fact that the issue as such emerged in France in 1974, i.e. the first year of our study (Favell, 
1998).  
Beyond immigration, it is striking that there are a certain number of significant decreases 
over time, but hardly any increases. Any explanation of this phenomenon could be based 
and/or would be related to the phenomenon of increasing entropy that we alluded to earlier. 
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As entropy increases, the relative of over-representation of certain issues fades. At the same 
time there is only a much more limited number of issues that increases. Finally there is a large 
number of issues that does not change significantly. 
This shows that future studies should rather look for cyclical explanations. This also means 
that the dynamics of attention for these issues may be subject to more political dynamics than 
to larger a-partisan forces. Further analyses will have to look at the dynamics of change in 
greater detail.  
Figure 2.3  
 
Finally, it is also worth looking at the issues that actually decrease and increase in relative 
importance. While there are some more anecdotal issues, several major issues diminish: 
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energy, macroeconomic policy, agriculture, trade, foreign policy, immigration, labour issues, 
government operations and rights. This reads like a list of “grand” policies, i.e. policies that 
have been associated with highly proactive and interventionist states. This would of course 
need further elaboration, but appears to support regulatory-state theses. Among those 
increasing significantly, we see the environment and health in particular.  
Many issues have quite substantive errors showing that significant fluctuations took place 
over the years. Variance has to be accounted for through different explanations.  
This section would thus confirm that there are some areas where change clearly transcends 
political alternations.  We are not able, within the limits of this paper, to evaluate exactly to 
which extent this changes over time validate any of the theses exposed in section 1 
concerning the long-term evolution of policies. Yet, there clearly appears to be some 
“generational” change of policy change that appears to confirm common sense intuitions. As 
state interventionism in the economy fades, macroeconomic or energy policies become less 
important. Similar explanations could be mobilized for energy and agriculture. The rise of 
economic regulation (not significant) and environmental issues appears to mirror those 
changes. The other issues do not support this kind of change. But it is also true that health and 
crime have become increasingly salient for different reasons. Future studies should look at 
internal dynamics and trade-offs in greater detail than we were able to do it here. 
 
3. Examples of policy sectors 
We will now look at a certain number of specific policy sectors. We selected four issues for 
this case study: topic codes 1 (macroeconomics), 7 (environment), 13 (social policies), and 15 
(economic regulations). Macroeconomic issues and economic regulations are worth 
comparing, as data may reveal interesting clues concerning the hypothetical replacement of 
macroeconomic policies by economic regulations when it comes to state economic 
interventionism. Besides, environment appeared as a public issue in the 1970s, and is 
therefore encompassed by our data. Finally, social policies are considered as a left-wing issue, 
and appear to be an interesting variable to evaluate the impact of partisanship on issue 
attention. 
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Table 2.1 – Crosstab of frequencies and percentages for each topic code 
 
As table 2.1 shows, the environment appears as an “average” political issue in terms of 
attention, close to the total average of all topic codes, whereas macroeconomics clearly 
appears as one of the major issues. Social policies and economic regulations show comparable 
levels for. Communications. Social policies, however, are characterized by really little 
political action, whereas on the contrary economic regulations show intense law-making 
activity. 
The case of attention to macroeconomic issues is illustrated in figure 2.4. Governmental 
attention to this policy sector has gradually decreased. Before 1981 we find higher levels of 
attention to macroeconomic issues with a unique peak in 1982 during the Mitterrand 
Presidency and the expansionary economic policy program that was abandoned two years 
later.  
Figure 2.4: Attention to Macroeconomic issues over time (1974-2006)  
 
Macroecon. Environment Social policies Econ. Regul. Total average
Freq
C 448 197 211 253 196.96
P 191 98 44 201 97.67
C+P 639 295 255 454 294.5
Percent
C 8.42% 3.70% 3.97% 4.76% 3.70%
P 8.15% 4.18% 1.88% 8.58% 4.17%
C+P 8.35% 3.85% 3.33% 5.93% 3.85%
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After 1982 we observe small cylcles of attention, but attention never reaches again the levels 
of the early eighties even during periods of economic crisis.  
Figure 2.5 – Economic regulation 
 
Economic regulation has increased over the same period. This could confirm regulatory state 
theses on the decline of economic interventionism and the increase of economic regulation. 
Yet, while the titles of the two categories match the language used by the main defenders of 
these theses (Majone, 1993), it is not certain that our own sub-categories meet those 
definitions unambiguously. Put differently, while this clearly points into that direction, this 
statement will require a more refined analysis.   
The Environment shows a different pattern (figure 2.5). Attention follows a cyclical pattern 
since 1974 with a first major peak in 1978 under Raymond Barre, followed by relatively little 
attention during the first socialist governments. From the early nineties onwards, attention 
increases significantly. The Jospin years, the first time the Greens actively participate in the 
national government, are characterized by below average activity – surprisingly enough. The 
highest historical levels of sattention are matched under the second Chirac presidency in the 
context of the “Grenelle de l’environnement”.  
Figure 2.6 – Attention to environmental issues over time (1974-2006) 
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The general distribution for social policies (figure 2.7) is clearly characterized by attention 
cycles, with sevaral peaks over the years. In particular, there are some quite significant 
negative peaks, such as the Barre 1 government in 1976 and the Bérégovoy government in 
1992. The latter appears to be electorally motivated, as elections were approaching and the 
left-wing minority government was having a very negative media coverage.  
 
Figure 2.7 – Attention to Social Policies during time (1974-2006) 
 
The upper bar on the past four figures provides information on government majorities and 
divided government. Four none of the four figures a clear-cut pattern can be identified. There 
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is no unambiguous left or right “preference” four certain issues, nor for punctuations (orange 
marks on the x-axis). We will look a those patterns in more detail in the next section.  
In sum this last subsection has confirmed the overall conclusion that there clearly are long-
term changes and patterns. But that these can hardly account for all of the changes and 
variance that can be observed. This may point to other explanations. Some policies may be 
more time-independent then others. This could also mean that some policies are more 
sensitive to political change and factors than others. The next section will start looking for this 
type of explanations.  
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Section 3: Do parties matter? 
As we discussed in section 1, there is a large debate on the effective impact of parties on 
public policy contents and attention. A vast literature in public policy argues that parties 
hardly ever count and that policymaking is determined by subsystemic dynamics, external 
shocks or path-dependency. In this section, we will question those conclusions trying to test 
for partisan influence on attention. In order to do so, we will first look at “policy 
punctuations” before looking at overall partisan effects. 
 
1.  Agendas and punctuations 
Punctuations correspond to a sudden increase of government attention for a particular subject 
(here sorted by major topic code6), and are computed so that any increase of statements for a 
given topic code which exceeds two standard deviations based on all variations for this topic 
code is considered a punctuation. Hence, this chapter does not concern the structure of global 
evolutions, but exclusively focuses on the characteristics of sudden shifts in governmental 
attention. Punctuations were computed only for communications and bill proposals, as the 
other two statement types were minor (see introduction). 
Punctuations and punctuated equilibriums are central to Baumgartner and Jones’s argument 
on the politics of attention (Baumgartner, Breunig et al., 2006; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 
2005). Fundamentally, they argue that changes in the distribution of attention of governments 
is not normal, but leptokurtic. The figure below illustrates the characteristics of normal and 
leptokurtic distribution. 
                                                 
6
 Please refer to topic codes list in Annex 1. 
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Figure 3.1 – Types of distribution 
 
Compared to the normal distribution, a leptokurtic distribution is characterized by a very high 
central peak7, comparatively low shoulder and relatively fat tails. This means that in such 
distributions of change, little or nothing takes place for the vast majority of cases. Almost no 
cases change moderately and a significant number of cases change radically.  
Put differently, attention is not proportional to the importance (or salience or visibility) of 
given problems. Rather, attention is characterized by a great deal of inertia. It is very difficult 
for new issues to make it into the governmental agenda. Baumgartner and Jones call those 
obstacles to proportional attention (and normal distribution of attention) institutional friction. 
For Jones, Wilkerson and Larson-Price (2009),  
Institutional friction refers to formal institutional structures that introduce decision and 
transaction costs. Institutions shape the level of consensus required for action as well as the 
boundaries of policy action. 
 
However, once they have finally got the attention of the government, this attention will be 
strong, leading to major policy measures and over-compensating for stagnation in previous 
periods. This is the results of cascading, some sort of spill-over effect whereby actors 
interested by the same topic get more and more involved, the more other actors get involved. 
According to Walgrave and Vliegthart (2008: 11):  
                                                 
7
 The black curve on the right-hand graph represents the normal distribution from the left-hand graph. 
  
 
28 
The more a policy agenda is determined by (1) several actors, that are (2) structurally equivalent, that 
(3) communicate intensively with each other, who operate in a (4)competitive environment leading to 
(5) immediate rewards/sanctions for these actors, and the more (6) the game these actors play is 
iterative and low cost, the more the policy agenda at stake will be characterized by cascading/imitation 
processes rather than by friction. 
These three concepts – punctuations, friction and cascades – are the cornerstone of 
Baumgartner and Jones’ approach to policy change. The communiqués do correspond to a 
large extent to a leptokurtic distribution, as figure 3.2 shows. This figure shows that 
distribution of year-to-year changes in relative attention across all issues.  
Figure 3.2 – Density plots for changes in government attention 
 
This distribution does indeed correspond to expectations, at least in tendency. There is some 
variance across items, though. The fact that the curve stops at –1 is simply that attention 
cannot diminish by more than 100 per cent. Yet, it is true that decreases are smoother on 
average than increases, as the analysis of punctuations that follows will show. For 
communications, there are increases of up to 1000 percent (!). 
The plain line gives the density of a normal distribution with the same mean and standard 
deviation as the dashed line, which represents the real density. Bills appear to be slightly more 
“normal” than communications. But they also show fat tails, showing that radical change, in 
the area of +400% of attention is not that uncommon. Totals owe to both and decrees and 
ordinances. Bills have another peculiarity: they show much more “negative” negative changes 
than communications. There are more issues where government simply stops caring. The 
explanation is probably simple: once on transports or energy is adopted, there won’t be a 
major law in the following year.  
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Beyond these simple observations, the problem with punctuation, friction and cascading is 
that the implementation of any of those concepts is – unsurprisingly – not straightforward. 
This section deals in particular with the problem of punctuations. The definition of 
punctuations is not obvious or consensual. In principle, punctuations are those changes that 
are situated in the fat tails of the distributions. Put differently, the term designates 
disproportionate changes in attention. However, when exactly can a change be considered to 
be radical or disproportionate? In a recent publication, Jennings and John used a rather 
arbitrary definition of punctuations, i.e. a relative change of 250 percent between two periods 
(Jennings & John, forthcoming). We tested several potential measures and finally adopted – 
we believe – a less arbitrary measure that is more in line with the concept of leptokurtosis. 
This measure is change greater than 2 ½ standard-deviations in absolute figures. This allows 
to take into account changes in each policy sector. Changes in relative importance tend to 
overemphasize the importance of “big” policy areas. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of 
punctuations by topic. 
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Figure 2.2 – Punctuations (Communications & bill proposals) per topic code 
 
 
Although the number of punctuations for communications and proposals is similar (54% vs 
46%), figure 2.2 first shows that some topics are more likely than others to be subject to 
sudden changes in government attention. Indeed, topics such as human rights (nb. 2), justice 
& crime (nb. 12), technology (17) and foreign trade (18) appear as major issues, whereas 
other topics are subject to little attention change, such as natural disasters (code 27 – 2 
punctuations) – which seems logical for the latter should tend to occur more randomly.  
It also appears that punctuations of attention are either oriented toward communication or 
governmental action (bill proposals). Considering that a fair approximation of a major 
discrepancy between communication and action could be a more than twofold discrepancy, 
macroeconomics (code 1) is characterised by intense political action but little communication, 
whereas sport, foreign policy, social policies and justice & crime (codes 29 19 13 12) seem to 
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require much communication, though it is not followed by legislative action. Other topics 
show rather balanced governmental attention for both items. 
However, as chart 2 shows, communication and action are not evenly divided across time. 
Massive government shifts in communication occurred during the Barre 1 and Barre 2 
cabinets (late 1976 to early 1978), but also from 1980 to 1983 (late Barre 3 and Mauroy 1 and 
2 cabinets), and in 1991 and 1996 (Rocard 2 / Cresson, and Juppé 2). On the contrary, intense 
increases of governmental action occurred in 1976 (Chirac 1), 1995 (Juppé 1 and 2), the early 
years of the Jospin government (1998 to 1999), and of the Raffarin 1 and 2 cabinets (2002). 
Although such punctuations do not seem to be highly correlated to time periods, they give us 
clues and lead us to interpret changes in attention through partisan orientation. 
 
2. Punctuations and parties 
The impact of parties and government type can be measured simply with the information 
summarized in table 1 be measured through left/right cleavages, and united/divided 
government. Although these are not the only valuable measures to study partisan structures, 
they are widely recognised and appear as a fair preliminary approach. We define right(left)-
wing governments simply as those led by a right(left)-wing Prime Minister; whether the 
President is right- or left-wing determines whether the government is united or divided8. 
                                                 
8 Indeed, in case of divided government, the Prime Minister is said to be preponderant in the French political 
system. Therefore, the government's alignment is determined by the Prime Minister's alignment. 
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Figure 2.4 – Punctuations by topic code and left/right partisanship 
 
 
A major result here is that right-wing governments initiated far more punctuations than left-
wing governments (39 vs 18 for communications, 37 vs 12 for proposals). The difference 
remains significant even once cabinet length is controlled for: with respectively 18 and 14 
years in power from 1974 to 2006, the right scores an average 2.16 (communications) and 
2.05 (proposals) punctuation-per-year ratio, whereas the left totalises 1.28 (communications) 
and 0.85 (proposals).  
As far as communications are concerned (see figure 2.3), right-wing governments tend to 
monopolise most topics – especially transports (code 10), foreign trade (18), foreign policy 
(19), and sport (29) – whereas left-wing governments communicate comparatively more on 
partisan issues such as human rights (code 2) and social policies (13), but also technology and 
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research (17). Concerning bill proposals, we observe similar discrepancies with a right-wing 
domination on legislative action, although right-wing governments are more active in fields 
such as human rights (2), economic regulations (15) and transports (10), whereas left-wing 
governments focus on employment & job market (5), defence (16) and technology (17). Some 
issues are present on both sides (human rights, justice & crime, defence, foreign trade, and 
regional policies), and may therefore be considered as common major issues both in terms of 
communication and political action. 
Figure 2.5  – Partisan distribution of communications and proposals 
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Table 2.1 – Punctuations by partisan orientation  
 
As argued by a number of authors and most French politicians, divided government appears 
to be detrimental to government productivity9 – as measured by the number of punctuations10. 
Table 2.1 shows punctuation-per-year ratios that confirms that unified governments are 
clearly more active than divided governments. However, divided right-wing governments are 
still responsible for a greater number of punctuations divided left-wing governments for both 
communications and bill proposals. This result is in fact related to the overall higher activity 
of right-wing governments under the 5th Republic that we will come back to in the next 
section. There is thus a strong and significant impact of parties on punctuations in terms of the 
overall volume.  
We will now turn to the effect of parties on the relative attention on issues. Figure 2.6 shows 
that divided governments communicate more on their usual partisan issues, such as social 
policies (13) for the left, or economic regulations and foreign policy (15, 19) for the right – 
although the correlation might not be significant. The right-wing punctuation on natural 
disasters (27) may be considered as contingent. As for bill proposals (chart 9), there does not 
seem to be any obvious pattern, probably due to the lack of contextual details. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 It has to be mentioned here that a large number of authors ranging from George Tsebelis (2002) to Arendt 
Lijphart (1999) favour lower levels of activity as this may preserve budgets for the former and social peace for 
the latter. 
10
 The work of Coleman or Edwards and colleagues (Coleman, 1999; Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997) 
contradicts here the influential work of Alan Mayhew (1991). Sébastian Lazardeux has developed a similar 
argument in his recent PhD-thesis (Lazardeux, 2008). 
Unified Right Unified Left Overall
Years 4.91 3.66 14.75 9.66 33
Comm
Punct Nb 1 4 35 17 57
Punct/year 0.2 1.09 2.37 1.76 1.73
Bill Prop Punct Nb 5 5 32 7 49
Punct/year 1.02 1.37 2.17 0.72 1.48
Divided – 
Left PM
Divided – 
Right PM
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Figure 2.6 – Punctuations by partisan structure by topic codes (communications) 
Punctuations in communications under divided government are extremely rare. Again the 
reason for this must be of institutional nature. Governments that have to share the political 
public sphere with a hostile president try to avoid clashes as much they can. This probably 
also means that they try to govern more through regulation than through legislation in order to 
keep it away from the media and public opinion. Bills appear to follow a similar logic, as 
Figure 2.7 shows.   
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Figure 2.7 – Punctuations by partisan structure by topic codes (proposals) 
 
Hence, right-wing governments are responsible for the large majority of radical attention 
shifts. Divided government, moreover, drastically reduces the number of punctuations. These 
results would clearly require further research and analysis, but represent clearly original 
evidence. The next section will deal in more detail with the issue of party orientation and 
legislative activity. 
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3. Legislative activism and parties 
Before looking at individual topics, Figure 3.1 gives simple comparison of government 
activity by type of government. A striking element across all sub-divisions and specifications 
is that right-wing governments are significantly more active than left-wing governments.  
 
Figure 3.1 confirms the results of the previous sub-section, the weighted average of yearly 
“governmental production”. There is a strong and significant difference between left-wing 
and right-wing governments. This difference is strongly visible under unified government, but 
remains significant under divided government and for the overall average. This, again, 
probably points to some kind of institutional bias against the left that has its origins in the 
very institutions of the 5th Republic. Indeed, a first research direction ought to be the effects of 
the permanent control of the Senate by right-wing parties. While it is not theoretically 
impossible that this institution will ever be controlled by the left, this is highly unlikely due to 
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the overrepresentation of small towns and rural areas. This point would need more 
elaboration, but this would go beyond the scope of the current paper.  
Figure 3.1 confirms another conclusion of the analysis of punctuations: the negative impact of 
divided government on overall productivity. The difference is very important on average, 
more than 36 per cent less activity for divided government. Yet, it also has to be noted that 
this difference is driven by the difference in communications and that slightly more bills are 
adopted under divided government, even though the difference is slim here.  
The figure in fact shows that bills (projets) are a lot less subject to variance than other items. 
Finally, while right-wing governments are more active under divided government than left-
wing cabinets, the difference is a lot smaller than for unified government. Put differently the, 
the depressing effect of divided government on activity is at least equally important, if not 
more, for right wing government. This probably explained why the 2000 amendment to the 
French constitution that brought in line the presidential mandate and the mandate of the 
Assemblée was supported by a wide majority of political actors across the political spectrum. 
This reform is assumed to rule out divided government for the foreseeable future. 
As we have seen above (see figure 2.1), the observed trends in the content of Government’s 
statements tend to reflect a cyclical pattern of issues in the French agenda more than a clear 
partisan dimension linked to Presidential or Prime Minister partisan orientation. For example, 
there is a gradual increase of government attention to Labor (3) over the period 1978-1986, 
with a successive contraction. For “Justice and Crime” (12) attention rises after the 1990s. 
Macroeconomic issues (1) were very strong in 1975 and contracted afterwards. In fact, we 
find elements of both stability and change in attention to the 26 major topics considered. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence of synchronization between changes in attention and 
presidential elections or shifts, or in other terms between government changes and policy-
agenda.  
At first glance, this might suggest that the policy-making agenda is driven solely by external 
factors, following autonomous cycles, independent of partisan changes. Our data does not 
appear to confirm theses that assume left-wing or right-wing “ownership” for certain issues – 
for instance, social policy with the former and defense with the latter. This section will dig 
deeper into those structures to understand how important parties are today and/or how their 
importance varies over time and across issues.  
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We will confine the analysis here to a simple left-right comparison of issue-by-issue attention. 
Figure 3.2 provides absolute weighted yearly attention to our 26 topics (see corresponding 
issues in Annex 1). As before, this confirms that right-wing governments are a lot more active 
than left-wing governments. This is virtually true across all issues, except “Research and 
Science” (17) where attention is equivalent. Right-wing governments are on average a lot 
more active on issues such as government operations, defence, foreign policy, justice and 
crime or immigration. This may be in line with existing stereotypes, but right-wing 
governments are also more active on the environment or labour, i.e. issues that are historically 
more associated with left-wing parties..  
Figure 3.2 – Attention in Communiqués and Proposals per topic code and partisanship 
 
But even more surprising is the fact that both left-wing and governments show similar 
patterns in the relative structure of attention. Both right-wing and left-wing governments 
clearly focus governmental attention on four main topics. Those are: government operations 
(20), foreign affairs (19), Labour (5) and Macroeconomic issues (1).  
Interestingly, Left/ Right variation occurs in other policy sectors which are generally 
characterized by lower average attention. For example, right-wing governments pay 
considerably more attention to Defense, Immigration, Energy and Agriculture (topics 16, 9, 8 
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and 4) than left-wing governments. Defense and immigration are historically associated with 
right-wing parties. These differences would thus tend to confirm the importance of partisan 
differences. This may also tell us something about the relative importance of “small” issues. 
Differentiation among parties may indeed take place on those smaller issues, provided that 
they are particularly visible or salient. We are not able, at this stage, to say anything 
significant about the salience of issues, but ongoing research on media attention should allow 
for a more complete analysis in the future.  
Figures 3.3 – Communications: topic code and left/right partisanship 
 
Figure 3.2 is based on totals of government actions. This includes here both projects and 
communications. Yet one could assume that there are different patterns. It could be that 
governments communicate on some issues and legislate on others. There may also be 
policymaking cycles with periods which are marked by communication and periods where 
governments legislate. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide information about average 
communications and bills by majority. Results are inconclusive.  
Left-wing governments communicate comparatively less than right-wing governments on all 
topics, except for economic regulation (15) where left-wing government communicates a little 
more than right wing ones. Apart from this exception, we find patterns similar to those for 
overall levels of activity (figure 3.1) and the issue averages of figure 3.2: the gap in 
communications is smaller for government operations and foreign issues (topics 20 and 19, 
both characterized by higher levels of attention) and greater for policy sectors characterized 
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by a lower level of attention as Defense, Immigration, Energy and Agriculture (topics 16, 9, 8 
and 4). 
Figures 3.4 – Bills:, topic code and left/right partisanship 
 
Looking at bills (figure 3.4), we find, again, a clear “advantage” for right-wing governments. 
Furthermore, right-wing governments focus on government operation and foreign issues, 
Justice, Labour and Macroeconomic issues (topics 20, 19, 12, 5 and 1). Even on economic 
regulation, where left-wing governments communicate more, right wing governments 
legislate more. Left wing governments tend to concentrate on the same topics as right-wing 
ones: government operation, foreign issues, justice (20, 19,12,5, 1).  
Another interesting result is that differences between left and right are clearly more 
pronounced than for communications. Again, an explanation of these differences has to be 
sought for in the institutional set-up of the 5th Republic. Moreover, the evolution of long-term 
trends should be dissected in greater detail, as well as the relative evolution of different 
government agenda items.  
In sum, left-wing and right-wing governments tend to focus on same issues. Differences are 
small for the “big” issues (government operations, in particular). The gap in attention between 
Right-wing and Left-wing governments is comparatively small for policy sectors 
characterized by higher levels of attention. Differentials are stronger for policy sectors 
characterized by overall lower levels of attention. It can be hypothesized that those sectors 
benefit from higher salience, though this will require further research.   
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Conclusions: and beyond? 
This report provides a quick survey of the opportunities associated with our dataset on French 
government statements over the past thirty years. The analyses provided here are mainly 
descriptive. Yet, they provide a clear picture of the interest of the collected data, as well as 
some substantial results. Fundamentally, they show that this data may usefully complement 
ongoing research and debates on politics and institutional life under the 5th Republic, but also 
on policymaking. In fact, this data may help realizing a map of policies in France, taking into 
account the relative politicization, governmental attention and effective variance over time.  
There is a large set of potential research directions. The mentioned mapping of French 
policies with regard to political attention is a first research direction. This paper provides a 
starting point for this perspective, but this will require a more fine-tuned analysis of the 
evolution of individual agenda items. It may also require an additional analysis of sub-
categories that have not been dealt with in this paper.  
A second endeavor concerns the explanation of existing changes and differences. This 
concerns evolution over time, of course, but also left-right differentials in overall 
productivity. These issues will have to be dealt with in separate in-depth studies, combining 
the data presented here with additional indicators and data. The preliminary results presented 
in this paper point to potential explanations. 
Finally, the left-right divide or, more generally, speaking the effects of parties on 
policymaking probably would need more detailed analysis and explanation. Overall 
tendencies will have to be looked at in the light of electoral and larger political dynamics than 
was possible within the limits of this paper.  
In sum, we hope that this paper has demonstrated the interest of the communiqués data and 
the potential for future research that is attached to it.  
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Annex I – List of topic codes 
 
Topic 
Codes 
Policy Sectors 
1 Macroeconomic issues 
2 Civil rights, discrimination 
3 Health 
4 Agriculture, fishing, forestry 
5 Labour 
6 Education 
7 Environment  
8 Energy 
9 Immigration 
10 Transports 
12 Justice and Crime 
13 Social policies 
14 Housing and urban development 
15 Economic regulation 
16 Defence 
17 Space, science, technology 
18 Foreign trade 
19 International affairs and foreign 
assistance 
20 Government operations 
21 Public lands and water management 
23 Culture 
24 Local and regional policies 
27 Natural disasters 
28 Fires and accidents 
29 Sports 
30 Necrologies 
 
 
